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ADDRESSING RACIAL BIAS IN THE JURY
SYSTEM: ANOTHER FAILED ATTEMPT?
Alisa Micu*
INTRODUCTION
A long-standing rule of evidence, Rule 606(b), also referred to as
the no-impeachment rule, establishes that testimony of jurors
regarding events in deliberations cannot be used to question the
validity of a verdict.1 Courts have held that the no-impeachment rule
is the general tenet governing the use of juror testimony when a
defendant seeks a new trial.2 The purpose of this rule is to balance the
preservation of valid verdicts with the interests of ensuring a fair trial
for the defendant, and it expressly prohibits an inquiry based on juror
misconduct during deliberations.3 By not allowing defendants to
challenge jurors individually, the rule prevents endless appeals and
contests while simultaneously protecting the accused’s constitutional
right to a fair trial by a jury of his peers.4 The no-impeachment rule
presumes honesty during jury deliberations and only under certain
limited exceptions allows evidence from the jury room to challenge a
*J.D. Candidate, 2019, Georgia State University College of Law. I want to thank Professor Paul S.
Milich for his guidance and insight into the topic and feedback throughout the writing process. Thank
you also to the Georgia State University Law Review for all the hard work that went into editing this
Note.
1.Fed. R. Evid. 606(b); see Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 524 (2014). “Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b) provides that . . . juror testimony regarding what occurred in a jury room is [an]
inadmissible . . . ’inquiry into the validity of a verdict . . . .’ Rule 606(b) precludes a party seeking a new
trial from using . . . what another juror said in deliberations . . . .” Id.; see also Hyde & Schneider v.
United States, 225 U.S. 347, 384 (1912) (“[T]he testimony of jurors should not be received to show
matters which essentially inhere in the verdict itself and necessarily depend upon the testimony of the
jurors and can receive no corroboration.”), superseded by statute as stated in Pena-Rodriguez v.
Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
2. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) advisory committee’s note on subdivision (b) (“The authorities are in
virtually complete accord in excluding the evidence.”) (citing Fryer, Note on Disqualification of
Witnesses, Selected Writings on Evidence and Trial 345, 347 (Fryer ed. 1957); see also McDonald v.
Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269 (1915) (“[W]hat is unquestionably the general rule . . . the losing party cannot,
in order to secure a new trial, use the testimony of jurors to impeach their verdict.”).
3. McDonald, 238 U.S. at 265; see also United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 78 (1st Cir. 2009).
4. McDonald, 238 U.S. at 266.
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verdict.5 Under these exceptions, the rule admits testimony about
extraneous influence that may have prejudicially influenced the
verdict.6 Through the limited scope of its exceptions, the rule protects
the finality of verdicts and freedom of deliberations and prevents
jurors from being exposed to harassment based on their conduct
during deliberations.7
Once viewed as the backbone of the judicial system, the jury’s
competency has been called into question by concerns of due
process.8 In the 2017 Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado decision, the
Supreme Court of the United States weighed the importance of the
centuries-old principles that the no-impeachment rule seeks to protect
against the potential harm that jurors’ racial biases may have on the
defendant and the verdict.9 In doing so, the Court overturned a
Colorado Supreme Court decision that had barred evidence of a
juror’s racial statements made during deliberations under Federal
Rule of Evidence 606(b).10 Evaluating the protections afforded by the
5. Id. at 267–68.
The rule is based upon controlling considerations of a public policy which in these
cases chooses the lesser of two evils. When the affidavit of a juror, as to the
misconduct of himself or the other members of the jury, is made the basis of a motion
for a new trial the court must choose between redressing the injury of the private
litigant and inflicting the public injury which would result if jurors were permitted to
testify as to what had happened in the jury room.
Id. at 265. See also Grenz v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d 681, 693 (N.D. 1964) (“The law presumes that the jury
was composed of fair-minded persons and that their verdict expressed their honest judgment.”); Mattox
v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892) (“[T]he evidence of jurors as to the motives . . . which
affected their deliberations[] is inadmissible . . . [, b]ut a juryman may testify to any facts . . . of the
existence of any extraneous influence . . . .”), superseded by rule as stated in Pena-Rodriguez v.
Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
6. Villar, 586 F.3d at 83. (“Juror testimony about a matter characterized as ‘external’ to the jury is
admissible under Rule 606(b)[] while testimony about ‘internal’ matters is barred by the [r]ule.”).
7. See McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267–68 (explaining how jurors would be exposed to harassment
absent the no-impeachment rule). The Court explained:
Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from
them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a
verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make what
was intended to be a private deliberation[] the constant subject of public
investigation—to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and
conference.
Id.
8. Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and
Proposals for Reform, 48 Ala. L. Rev. 441, 445 (1997).
9. See generally Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
10. See generally id.
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Sixth Amendment, the Pena-Rodriguez Court concluded that the
Constitution requires an additional exception to the no-impeachment
rule.11 Thus, the Court held that evidence of racial statements made
during deliberations is allowed to impeach the credibility of a
verdict.12 The Court overturned precedent that excluded this evidence
as a necessary measure to the administration of justice and a guard
against the injury caused by racial bias.13
This Note explores the majority opinion and the dissents in PenaRodriguez regarding whether the Supreme Court has adequately
provided guidance for lower courts to follow the ruling, which now
allows exceptions for evidence of racial bias to Rule 606(b). Part I
discusses the history of the no-impeachment rule, its foundation in
the Sixth Amendment, and its constitutional requirements.14 Further,
Part I discusses the different approaches that courts have taken in
adopting Rule 606(b) and what problems courts have identified in its
application.15 Part II analyzes whether the Supreme Court, as a
practical matter, has provided a workable procedural scheme for
lower courts to follow in meeting their new legal obligation to
consider a juror’s racial bias after the verdict, or whether the Court
has left open important considerations, creating precedent that will
further erode the protections of the no-impeachment rule.16 Finally,
Part III proposes actions that the Supreme Court could take to clarify
questions raised by the Pena-Rodriguez ruling.17

11. Id. at 867.
12. Id. (“The Court must decide whether the Constitution requires an exception to the noimpeachment rule when a juror’s statements indicate that racial animus was a significant motivating
factor in his or her finding of guilt.”). Stating that “[t]he duty to confront racial animus in the justice
system is not the legislature’s alone[,]” the Court recognized that “[t]ime and again, this Court has been
called upon to enforce the Constitution’s guarantee against state-sponsored racial discrimination in the
jury system.” Id.
13. Id. (“[T]his Court has been called upon to enforce the Constitution’s guarantee against statesponsored racial discrimination in the jury system.”). The Court explained that “[t]he unmistakable
principle underlying these precedents is that discrimination on the basis of race, ‘odious in all aspects, is
especially pernicious in the administration of justice.’” Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868 (quoting Rose
v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)).
14. See infra Part I.
15. See infra Part I.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
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I. Background
Rooted in principles of ensuring verdict finality and the freedom of
juror deliberations, the no-impeachment rule has maintained the
integrity of the jury system and its deliberative components.18 It has
not only ensured the finality of verdicts but has also safeguarded
against harassment of jurors after a verdict has been rendered.19 The
jury’s independence from outside influence instills confidence that
the court’s decision is not biased toward any one particular party.20 A
direct correlation exists between the public’s confidence in a jury and
the jury’s ability to legitimize judicial outcomes.21 However, the
value placed in a jury’s ability to use “common sense” in its fact
finding has been diminished by increased concerns of juror
prejudice.22
A. The Origins of the No-Impeachment Rule
Rules prohibiting the use of juror testimony to impeach a verdict
originated in England and predate the ratification of the United States
Constitution.23 The English Mansfield Rule provided a rigid
approach to dealing with juror testimony by “prohibit[ing] jurors,
after the verdict was entered, from testifying either about their
subjective mental processes or about objective events that occurred
during deliberations.”24 American courts adopted the Mansfield Rule
18. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) advisory committee’s note on subdivision (b).
19. Id. Protection of the manner in which the jury reached its verdict “extends to each of the
components of deliberation, including arguments, statements, discussions, mental and emotional
reactions, votes, and any other feature of the process.” Id.; see also Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S.
Ct. 855, 861 (2017). “A general rule . . . give[s] substantial protection to verdict finality
and . . . assure[s] jurors that . . . their verdict . . . will not later be called into question based on the
comments or conclusions they expressed during deliberations. This principle, itself centuries old, is
often referred to as the no-impeachment rule.” Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861.
20. Smith, supra note 8, at 482–83.
21. Id. at 483 (“[I]f public confidence in the jury as an institution capable of arriving at ‘correct’ or
just outcomes is undermined then there will be a corresponding reduction in the ability of the jury to
confer legitimacy upon trial proceedings.”).
22. Id. at 487–88.
23. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863. The Mansfield rule originated in England in the case of Vaise
v. Delaval. Id. “Rules barring the admission of juror testimony to impeach a verdict . . . have a long
history[,] . . . pre-dat[ing] the ratification of the Constitution.” Id. at 875.
24. Id. at 863. The Mansfield Rule originated in Vaise v. Delaval, where Lord Mansfield did not
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but provided some exceptions.25 In Mattox v. United States, the Court
recognized an exception to the Mansfield rule and drew a distinction
between jury misconduct during deliberations and improper outside
influences upon jurors.26 As a result, some jurisdictions adopted the
federal approach to the no-impeachment rule, permitting exceptions
only for testimony about events extraneous to the deliberative
process.27 Others adopted the Iowa rule, a more lenient version of the
Mansfield rule that allowed jurors to testify about objective facts and
events occurring during deliberations.28

allow juror testimony that the case had been decided through a game of chance. Id. This rule “prohibited
jurors, after the verdict was entered, from testifying either about their subjective mental processes or
about objective events that occurred during deliberations.” Id.
25. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 863 (2017).
American courts adopted the Mansfield rule as a matter of common law, though not in
every detail. Some jurisdictions adopted a different, more flexible version of the noimpeachment bar known as the “Iowa rule.” Under that rule, jurors were prevented
only from testifying about their own subjective beliefs, thoughts, or motives during
deliberations. Jurors could, however, testify about objective facts and events occurring
during deliberations, in part because other jurors could corroborate that testimony.
An alternative approach, later referred to as the federal approach, stayed closer to the
original Mansfield rule.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Martinez v. Food City, Inc., 658 F. 2d 369, 373–74.
26. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148 (1892), superseded by rule as stated in
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
There is, however, a recognized distinction between what may and what may not be
established by the testimony of jurors to set aside a verdict.
. . . ”Public policy forbids that a matter resting in the personal consciousness of one
juror should be received to overthrow the verdict, because . . . it is not accessible to
other testimony; it gives to the secret thought of one the power to disturb the expressed
conclusions of twelve; its tendency is to produce bad faith on the part of a
minority . . . ; to induce tampering with individual jurors subsequent to the verdict. But
as to overt acts, they are accessible to the knowledge of all the jurors; if one affirms
misconduct, the remaining eleven can deny; one cannot disturb the action of the
twelve; it is useless to tamper with one, for the eleven may be heard.”
Id. at 148–49 (quoting Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539, 545 (Kan. 1874)); see also Robert A. Gallagher,
RECENT DECISION: Pennsylvania’s Exception to the No-Impeachment Rule Regarding Jury
Deliberations Affected by Extraneous Information: Pratt v. St. Christopher’s Hosp., 44 Duq. L. Rev.
575, 584 (2006) (“Jurors may use affidavits to testify as to overt acts, more commonly referred to as
extraneous prejudicial information that may have prejudiced the jury.”).
27. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863. Under the federal rule, “the no-impeachment bar permitted an
exception only for testimony about events extraneous to the deliberative process, such as reliance on
outside evidence—newspapers, dictionaries, and the like—or personal investigation of the facts.” Id.
28. Id. (“Under [the Iowa] rule, jurors were prevented only from testifying about their own
subjective beliefs, thoughts, or motives during deliberations . . . [but] could, however, testify about
objective facts and events occurring during deliberations, in part because other jurors could corroborate
that testimony.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

Published by Reading Room, 2019

5

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 8

848

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:3

In 1975, by adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress
rejected the Iowa rule, endorsing a broad no-impeachment approach
with only a few exceptions.29 The preliminary rule of evidence has
undergone several changes over the decades, which narrowed the
scope originally contemplated.30 Congress did not specifically
address juror bias in the no-impeachment rule.31 Rather, the rule
prohibits a juror from testifying about any events that occurred
during jury deliberations with exceptions only for “extraneous
prejudicial information” introduced to a jury, “outside
influence . . . improperly brought,” or “a mistake . . . made in
entering the verdict . . . .”32 As a result of the rule’s lack of specificity
in dealing with racial bias, jurisdictions have applied it
inconsistently.33

29. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915) (excluding juror testimony about objective events
in the jury room, where the jury allegedly calculated a damages award by averaging the numerical
submissions of each member, because admitting that evidence would have dangerous consequences);
see also Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 864; Amanda R. Wolin, Comment, What Happens in the Jury
Room Stays in the Jury Room . . . but Should It?: A Conflict Between the Sixth Amendment and Federal
Rule of Evidence 606(b), 60 UCLA L. Rev. 262, 269 (2012).
Although Rule 606(b) imposes a general prohibition on juror testimony regarding any
statement or incident occurring during deliberations, this bar is subject to three
exceptions. The first exception permits a juror to provide testimony regarding
extraneous prejudicial information brought to the jury’s attention. The second
exception allows testimony regarding outside influences improperly brought to bear on
the deliberation process. The third exception permits jurors to give testimony
regarding clerical errors made in filling out the verdict form.
Id.
30. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) advisory committee’s note to subdivision (b); see also Pena-Rodriguez, 137
S. Ct. at 864 (“The substance of the [r]ule has not changed since 1975, except for a 2006 modification
permitting evidence of a clerical mistake on the verdict form.”). The 2006 amendment to Rule 606
specifically rejects the broader exception, adopted by some courts, allowing the use of juror testimony to
prove a misunderstanding about the consequences of their verdict because an inquiry into whether the
jury misunderstood an instruction goes to the “jurors’ mental processes underlying the verdict, rather
than the verdict’s accuracy in capturing what the jurors had agreed upon.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) advisory
committee’s note on subdivision (b).
31. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).
32. Id. 606(b)(1), (2); see also Wolin, supra note 29, at 272 (“Congress did not specifically address
juror bias or prejudice and, thus, did not state whether it is the type of objective matter about which
jurors should not be permitted to testify.”).
33. See infra Section I.C.
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B. The no-impeachment rule and the Requirements of the Sixth
Amendment
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to an impartial jury in a
criminal trial.34 The Fourteenth Amendment extends the guarantees
of the Sixth Amendment to the states.35 At common law, the right to
a fair trial does not provide for the ability to invalidate a jury verdict
on the basis of juror testimony regarding misconduct during
deliberations.36 Thus, the circuits are split regarding the extent to
which the Sixth Amendment protects defendants’ rights when they
believe that a juror’s bias or prejudice influenced the final verdict.37
The conflict between the Sixth Amendment and Rule 606(b) is
reconciled by exceptions—in certain circumstances—to the
prohibition of the use of information from jury deliberations to
impeach verdicts.38 Regardless of how different jurisdictions have
34. U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 40 (1986) (quoting Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 532 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (“The Sixth
Amendment guarantees criminal defendants an impartial jury . . . . ’[T]he right to an impartial jury
carries with it the concomitant right . . . to insure [sic] that the jury is impartial.’”); see also PenaRodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 871–72 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 500 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)) (“The Sixth Amendment’s protection of the right, ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions,’ to a
‘trial, by an impartial jury,’ is limited to the protections that existed at common law when the
Amendment was ratified.”).
35. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (“Because we believe that trial by jury in
criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which . . . would come within the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee.”).
36. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 872.
37. Wolin, supra note 29, at 265–66. “There is a split among the circuit courts regarding the
intersection of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of trial by an impartial jury and Rule 606(b)’s
prohibition of juror testimony when a juror voluntarily raises allegations of another juror’s bias or
prejudice after the verdict.” Id.
38. Id. The Court stated:
There is a split among the circuit courts regarding the intersection of the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of trial by an impartial jury and Rule 606(b)’s prohibition of
juror testimony when a juror voluntarily raises allegations of another juror’s bias or
prejudice after the verdict.
....
At first it appears that the language of Rule 606(b) provides an absolute prohibition on
a juror testifying to what transpired during deliberations: Rule 606(b) states in part that
“a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the
jury’s deliberations.” Congress, however, also added three exceptions to this bar . . . .
“A juror may testify about whether: (A) extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jury’s attention; [or] (B) an outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror . . . .”
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applied the rule, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment concerns have to
some extent shaped the decision as to whether a juror has improperly
prejudiced a verdict.39 In Batson v. Kentucky the Court made a first
attempt to eliminate racial bias from the jury system at the voir dire
stage of the trial process, but the attempt proved to be ineffective.40
Thus, some courts have specifically recognized that in instances
where voir dire does not permit an informed basis on which to
exercise peremptory challenges, the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of
fairness in the trial process may require an inquiry into whether
jurors’ racial biases influenced the decision to convict.41 Although
every state follows some version of the no-impeachment rule, some
have implemented exceptions for when a juror’s racial bias
influences deliberations.42

Id. (footnotes omitted)
39. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) advisory committee’s note on subdivision (b).
40. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
41. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 40 (1986) (quoting Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310
(1931)) (“[W]e held long ago that ‘essential demands of fairness’ may require a judge to ask jurors
whether they entertain any racial prejudice.”); see also Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182,
189 (1981).
There are, however, constitutional requirements with respect to questioning
prospective jurors about racial or ethnic bias. The “special circumstances” under which
the Constitution requires a question on racial prejudice were described in Ristaino v.
Ross, by contrasting the facts of that case with those in Ham v. South Carolina, in
which we held it reversible error for a state court to fail to ask such a question.
Id. (citations omitted).
42. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 865 (2017). Forty-two jurisdictions follow the
federal Rule, whereas nine follow the Iowa Rule, which states that jurors could testify about objective
facts and events occurring during deliberations but not about their own subjective beliefs, thoughts, or
motives during deliberations. Id. Other courts have treated the issue of racial bias differently. United
States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1240–41 (10th Cir. 2008), abrogated by Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado,
137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). For example, the court in Benally declined to find an exception because other
safeguards protect a defendants’ constitutional interests. Id. In Williams v. Price, the court indicated in
dicta that no exception exists but held that the racial bias exception was not clearly established.
Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 237–39 (3d Cir. 2003), abrogated by Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137
S. Ct. 855 (2017). The court in Martinez v. Food City, Inc. held that evidence of racial bias is excluded
by Rule 606(b) but did not address whether the Constitution may demand an exception. Martinez v.
Food City, Inc., 658 F. 2d 369, 373–74 (5th Cir. 1981). In Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Telephone
Co., the Supreme Court of Iowa did not say that a juror’s declaration cannot be received in any case.
Wright v. Ill. & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 201 (1866). By Iowa Code § 1810, the affidavits of jurors
may be received on applications for new trials, but cannot be compelled to make them, and it is unclear
that they could be used to impeach a verdict. Id. at 198.
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C. How States Have Treated Issues of Juror Bias in Deliberations
Courts have struggled to find a balance between protecting a
defendant’s right to a fair trial and protecting the integrity and
freedom of jury deliberations and the finality of verdicts.43 Some
courts have made exceptions to the rule in cases where racial bias
influenced deliberations, whereas others have recognized safeguards
that ensure a fair trial without the need for this exception.44
1. Racial Bias is an Exception to the no-impeachment rule
The courts that have declined to lay down an inflexible rule
recognize that to administer justice there may be instances where a
juror’s testimony of another juror’s racially biased conduct must be
considered.45 These courts have addressed the constitutional need for
an exception to Rule 606(b) where instances of racial bias influence a
jury verdict.46 For example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in Shillcutt v. Gagnon determined that
fundamental principles of fairness and justice could require an
exception for racial bias under the no-impeachment rule but
ultimately held that it was unlikely that a “racial slur” that occurred
toward the end of deliberations could have influenced the verdict so
as to prejudice the defendant.47 In contrast, in United States v.
43. United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1119 (9th Cir. 2001).
44. Id. at 1119–20; see also McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268 (1915).
45. McDonald, 238 U.S. at 268. The Court distinguished the issue solely from the point of view of a
private party who has been wronged by a juror’s misconduct from jurors as witnesses in criminal cases
generally and determined that the legislature would have repealed or modified the rule had it thought
necessary. Id. The Court pointed out that “[although] it may often exclude the only possible evidence of
misconduct, a change in the rule ‘would open the door to the most pernicious arts and tampering with
jurors’” and that “‘[i]t would lead to the grossest fraud and abuse’ and ‘no verdict would be safe.’” Id.;
see also Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150 (1892) (“Private communications, possibly
prejudicial, between jurors and third persons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are absolutely
forbidden, and invalidate the verdict, at least unless their harmlessness is made to appear.”), superseded
by rule as stated in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
46. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 865 (“Various Courts of Appeals have had occasion to consider a
racial bias exception and have reached different conclusions . . . hav[ing] held or suggested there is a
constitutional exception for evidence of racial bias.”).
47. Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987).
[F]urther review may be necessary in the occasional case in order to discover the extremely rare abuse
that could exist even after the court has applied the rule and determined the evidence incompetent . . . .
[W]e must consider whether prejudice pervaded the jury room, whether there is a substantial probability
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Henley, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a constitutional violation
could occur even in the absence of prejudice pervading the jury
room, where only a single juror expressed bias or prejudice.48
2. Rule 606(b) Applies to All Statements Made in Deliberations
In Commonwealth v. Steele, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
addressed and applied the bar to a juror’s testimony that racial bias
influenced deliberations.49 However, the court strictly construed the
exceptions to Rule 606(b) as applicable only to outside influence, not
statements made by the jurors themselves.50 Refusing to allow Rule
606(b) to thwart the protections provided by the Sixth Amendment,
the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Benally, recognized the dangers
of searching for perfect justice through jury verdicts and suggested
that decisions rendered by ordinary citizens—even if irrational at
times—are more likely to resemble justice than “law-bound”
decisions by “professional jurists.”51 The court relied on other
that the alleged racial slur made a difference in the outcome of the trial.
Id.
48. Henley, 238 F.3d at 1120 (quoting Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998) (en
banc)) (“In our circuit . . . it would not be necessary to demonstrate that ‘prejudice pervaded the jury
room’ in order to establish a constitutional violation; we have made clear that the Sixth Amendment is
violated by ‘the bias or prejudice of even a single juror.’”).
49. Commonwealth v. Steele, 961 A.2d 786, 808 (Pa. 2008).
50. Id. One juror made the remark during trial that the defendant should “fry, get the chair[,] or be
hung [sic].” Id. at 807–08. He said that race was an issue from the inception of the trial, and that another
juror commented on the defendant’s race early in the trial, and further “‘noted the race of three victims
and stated that, on that basis alone, the defendant was probably guilty’ . . . . Once the verdict was
entered, the jurors . . . became incompetent to testify regarding any internal discussions or
deliberations.” Id.
51. United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008), abrogated by Pena-Rodriguez v.
Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). The court explained:
To treat the jury as a black box may seem to offend the search for perfect justice. The
rule makes it difficult and in some cases impossible to ensure that jury verdicts are
based on evidence and law rather than bias or caprice. But our legal system is
grounded on the conviction, borne out by experience, that decisions by ordinary
citizens are likely, over time and in the great majority of cases, to approximate justice
more closely than more transparently law-bound decisions by professional jurists.
Indeed, it might even be that the jury’s ability to be irrational, as when it refuses to
apply a law against a defendant who has in fact violated it, is one of its strengths.
Id. (emphasis omitted). “[T]he Sixth Amendment embodies a right to ‘a fair trial but not a perfect one,
for there are no perfect trials.’” Id. at 1240 (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464
U.S. 548, 553 (1984)). The court further reasoned that “[w]here the attempt to cure defects in the jury
process—here, the possibility that racial bias played a role in the jury’s deliberations—entails the
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safeguards in the trial process that adequately protect a defendant’s
constitutional rights, taking note of the fact that a juror determined to
lie would still go undetected in voir dire.52
3. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado
In light of the different approaches that courts have used in
considering whether racial bias is an exception to the noimpeachment rule, the Supreme Court in Pena-Rodriguez resolved
the dispute only insofar as it aligns with one side of the argument.53
In reaching this decision, the Court looked to precedent allowing
exceptions under Rule 606(b) in cases of extreme bias.54
Furthermore, the Court examined cases where these exceptions were
allowed and discovered a need for an answer to the question of
whether the Constitution requires an exception to Rule 606(b) in
instances where a juror’s racial statements significantly motivated the
juror’s decision in a verdict.55 Affirmatively answering this question,
the only standard the Court set forth in Pena-Rodriguez for this
inquiry was for a lower court to analyze whether a juror’s statement
clearly indicated reliance on bias to convict so as to cast doubt on the
fairness and impartiality of deliberations and the verdict.56 The Court
dismissed concerns of intrusive inquiry into jury deliberations created
sacrifice of structural features in the justice system that have important systemic benefits, it is not
necessarily in the interest of overall justice to do so.” Id.
52. Id. The court specifically mentioned “voir dire, observation of the jury during court, reports by
jurors of inappropriate behavior before they render a verdict, and post-verdict impeachment by evidence
other than juror testimony.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
53. See Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2017).
54. Id. at 865–67. The Court looks to precedent to justify its decision to allow juror testimony in
cases of extreme bias. Id.
In Warger . . . the Court did reiterate that the no-impeachment rule may admit
exceptions. . . . [T]he Court warned of “juror bias so extreme that, almost by
definition, the jury trial right has been abridged.” “If and when such a case arises,” the
Court indicated it would “consider whether the usual safeguards are or are not
sufficient to protect the integrity of the process.”
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 n.3 (2014)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 869 (“To qualify, the statement must tend to show that racial animus was a significant
motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.”). Determination of this threshold is at the substantial
discretion of the trial court, in light of all circumstances. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855,
869 (2017).
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by the exception, as expressed in decisions favoring the exclusion of
evidence of bias,57 from the “recurring evil” of racial bias “risk[ing]
systemic injury to the administration of justice” in the present case.58
Recognizing that safeguards in the trial process cannot protect
against racial biases infiltrating jury deliberations, the Court found it
necessary to open to judicial inquiry a juror’s statement indicating
reliance on bias in reaching a verdict.59 The Pena-Rodriguez Court
thus concluded that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantees necessitate
this exception to Rule 606(b) and removed the bar on evidence of a
juror’s racist statements made in deliberations.60 Consequently, the
Court dismissed concerns of possible harassment to jurors or the
infringement on jurors’ freedom to deliberate.61 In its reasoning, the
Court looked to lower decisions that have long recognized the bias
exception and have not experienced those problems.62 However, the
Court did not address a standard or procedure to be used in reaching
this result.63
II.

Analysis

Throughout history, the Supreme Court has determined that
discrimination on the basis of race is damaging in all respects,

57. Id. at 866. See generally Warger, 135 S. Ct. 521; Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
Both Tanner and Warger rejected constitutional challenges to the no-impeachment rule as it pertains to
evidence of juror bias. Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 524; Tanner, 483 U.S. at 126.
58. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868. The court stated that “[a]n effort to address the most grave
and serious statements of racial bias is not an effort to perfect the jury but to ensure that our legal system
remains capable of coming ever closer to the promise of equal treatment under the law that is so central
to a functioning democracy.” Id.
59. Id. at 869 (quoting Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 195 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring)) (“Generic questions about juror impartiality may not expose specific . . . biases that can
poison jury deliberations. Yet more pointed questions ‘could well exacerbate whatever prejudice might
exist without substantially aiding in exposing it.’”).
60. Id. at 869 (“[T]he Court now holds that where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates
he . . . relied on racial stereotypes . . . to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires
that the no-impeachment rule . . . permit[s] the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s
statement . . . .”).
61. Id. at 870.
62. Id.
63. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 870. (“This case does not ask, and the Court need not address,
what procedures a trial court must follow when confronted with a motion for a new trial based on juror
testimony of racial bias.”).
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especially in the administration of justice.64 Over thirty years ago, in
an attempt to remove racial bias from the trial system, the Court ruled
in Batson v. Kentucky that race is not a legitimate basis for excluding
a prospective juror.65 The Court revisited the issue in Pena-Rodriguez
as it reached even further, overturning precedent which previously
protected juror deliberations “to ensure that our legal system remains
capable of coming ever closer to the promise of equal treatment
under the law that is so central to a functioning democracy.”66 This
Part examines the extent to which the Sixth Amendment compels the
Pena-Rodriguez review of juror deliberations that are supposed to
remain independent from outside influence or harassment.67 This Part
also focuses on whether the Court’s ruling is a workable scheme to
solving social injustice by removing racial bias from the jury system.

64. Id. at 867. “The Court has repeatedly struck down laws and practices that systematically exclude
racial minorities from juries.” Id. As examples, the Court offered the following cases: Neal v. Delaware,
103 U.S. 370 (1881); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394 (1935) (per curiam); Avery v. Georgia, 345
U.S. 559 (1953); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, (1954); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
Id.
65. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86–87 (1986).
“[A] jury is a body . . . composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is
selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates,
persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds.” . . . [A petit
jury] must be “indifferently chosen,” to secure the defendant’s right under the
Fourteenth Amendment to “protection of life and liberty against race or color
prejudice.”
Id. (citations omitted).
66. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.
67. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933). The Supreme Court has held:
Freedom of debate might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors
were made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the
world.
....
. . . No doubt the need is weighty that conduct in the jury room shall be untrammeled
by the fear of embarrassing publicity.
Id. at 13–16; see also Williams v. Cavazos, 646 F.3d 626, 643 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[N]o one, including the
judge, is even supposed to be aware of the views of individual jurors during deliberations, because a
jury’s independence is best guaranteed by secret deliberations . . . .”) (emphasis omitted), rev’d, 568
U.S. 289 (2013).
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A. Does the Court’s Ruling Expose Juries to Unrelenting
Scrutiny?
The Court explained that precedent upholding the no-impeachment
rule does not conflict with precedent that allows evidence of racial
bias to impeach a jury verdict.68 In doing so, the Court distinguished
Pena-Rodrgiuez from cases such as McDonald v. Pless, Tanner v.
United States, and Warger v. Shauers, where the Court upheld Rule
606(b) in cases of influence on the jury verdict.69 In discussing juror
misconduct in those cases, the Supreme Court argued that “neither
history nor common experience show that the jury system is rife with
mischief of these or similar kinds.”70 In McDonald, the Court did not
allow evidence of how the jury calculated damages by averaging the
numerical submissions of each jury member; in Tanner, the Court
excluded evidence that multiple jurors had been intoxicated during
trial; and in Warger, evidence that a forewoman failed to disclose
pro-defendant bias during voir dire was excluded under Rule
606(b).71 The Court characterized the jurors’ behavior in those three
cases as “troubling and unacceptable” and instances of jurors “gone
off course.”72 The Court further argued that eliminating racial bias is
not an “attempt to rid the jury of every irregularity” that can “expose
it to unrelenting scrutiny” because the Court in Tanner, Warger, and
McDonald upheld Rule 606(b) for different reasons than in PenaRodriguez.73 In the majority opinion in Pena-Rodriguez, Justice
68. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.
69. Id.
70. Id. The Court distinguished McDonald, where it rejected an exception to Rule 606(b) because
“the use of juror testimony about misconduct during deliberations would make what was intended to be
a private deliberation[] the constant subject of public investigation—to the destruction of all frankness
and freedom of discussion and conference.” Id. at 884; McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267–68
(1915); see also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 126 (1987) (quoting Jordan v. Massachusetts,
225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912)) (concluding that Rule 606(b) precluded a criminal defendant from
introducing evidence that multiple jurors had been intoxicated during trial and rejecting the contention
that this exclusion violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to “‘a tribunal both impartial and
mentally competent to afford a hearing.’”). In Warger, where the jury forewoman in a civil case
allegedly failed to disclose a prodefendant bias during voir dire, the Court again relied substantially on
existing safeguards for a fair trial. Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 (2014).
71. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 121–22; Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 525; McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267–68.
72. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.
73. Id. at 868.
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Kennedy reasoned that an effort to eliminate racial bias is “not an
effort to perfect the jury” but rather to ensure that our legal system
delivers the “promise of equal treatment under the law.”74
However, as Justice Alito pointed out in the dissenting opinion, the
Constitution places great importance on jurors’ ability to freely
deliberate as regular people do in ordinary lives, without the scrutiny
of “professionals who do not speak the language of ordinary
people.”75 In opening the door to intrusion on jury deliberations, even
in instances of racial bias, the expansion of the holding is unlikely to
be prevented.76 The dissenting opinion also pointed out the majority’s
failure to provide a good reason to distinguish the ruling in
McDonald from that in Pena-Rodriguez.77 In both cases, the
defendants had a strong interest in “demonstrating that the jury had
‘adopted an arbitrary and unjust method in arriving at their
verdict.’”78 McDonald involved allegations that the verdict had been
entered into by chance.79 The McDonald Court recognized that if it
allowed the verdict to be attacked with testimony of jurors, then “all
verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the
hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding.”80
The Pena-Rodriguez Court provided no guiding limitation in
applying the racial bias exception to Rule 606(b), which would
prevent this sort of inquiry into verdicts. 81
In Pena-Rodriguez, the Court did not convincingly explain why
the safeguards to ensure an impartial trial, as outlined in Tanner,

74. Id.
75. Id. at 875 (Alito, J., dissenting).
76. Id. In his dissent, Justice Alito points out:
Today, . . . the Court not only pries open the door; it rules that respecting the privacy
of the jury room, as our legal system has done for centuries, violates the
Constitution . . . . [A]lthough the Court tries to limit the degree of intrusion, it is
doubtful that there are principled grounds for preventing the expansion of today’s
holding.
Id.
77. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 875–76.
78. Id. at 876.
79. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915).
80. Id.
81. Id. See generally Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 855.
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inadequately prevent racial bias from infiltrating jury deliberations.82
Justice Kennedy pointed out that although these safeguards may be
important for discovering bias, they are insufficient because the
Constitution demands added precaution when dealing with racial
bias.83 He did not, however, explain why a juror who feels strongly
enough to report racial bias of such severity as to constitute an
infringement on the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair and
impartial trial would be less likely to do so after the trial has ended
than during deliberations.84
B. Does the Sixth Amendment Compel this Review of Juror
Testimony?
The Sixth Amendment affords a defendant the right to an impartial
and fair jury trial, including “a jury that is free of bias and that
decides the case solely on the evidence before it”; thus, a defendant’s
fundamental right becomes compromised when even one juror is
biased or prejudiced.85 Rule 606(b) seeks to protect this right by
restricting a juror’s testimony about another juror’s “subjective
thought processes, mental impressions, and emotional reactions, for it
82. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.
83. Id. at 869. The Court, in reasoning that racial bias must be treated with added precaution, stated:
For instance, this Court has noted the dilemma faced by trial court judges and counsel
in deciding whether to explore potential racial bias at voir dire. Generic questions
about juror impartiality may not expose specific attitudes or biases that can poison jury
deliberations. Yet more pointed questions “could well exacerbate whatever prejudice
might exist without substantially aiding in exposing it.”
The stigma that attends racial bias may make it difficult for a juror to report
inappropriate statements during the course of juror deliberations. It is one thing to
accuse a fellow juror of having a personal experience that improperly influences her
consideration of the case, as would have been required in Warger. It is quite another to
call her a bigot.
Id. at 870 (citations omitted).
84. See generally id.
85. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.; see also Wolin, supra note 29, at 264.
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is testimony on such internal matters that poses the greatest risk to
the policies underlying the general prohibition on juror impeachment
of a verdict.”86 Under the rule’s exceptions, however, testimony
about events “extraneous to the deliberative process” may be
admitted to impeach a verdict, but even then, a juror is only allowed
to testify as to the intrusion itself, not to how it affected
deliberations.87 The Court in Pena-Rodriguez found that the
Constitution mandates an additional exception for impeaching a
verdict where evidence of racial bias is thought to have influenced
the verdict.88 The Court did so by distinguishing racial bias from
other instances that might have led to the partiality of the verdict,
stating that racial bias is a “recurring evil” that would “risk systemic
injury to the administration of justice.”89 The Court based its
reasoning in part on precedent that suggests that Rule 606(b) allows
the possibility of an exception for the “gravest and most important
cases,” determining that racial bias warrants this kind of exception
under the Constitution.90 But how is racial bias different from other
“grave” influences on the jury verdict? As Justice Thomas pointed
out in his dissenting opinion, the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of
impartiality involved the “common[]law understanding of [the]
term,” which was that “jurors could ‘have no interest of their own
86. See Fed. R. Evid. 606(b)(1) (prohibiting juror testimony “about any statement made or incident
that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s
vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment”); see also Dean Sanderford,
The Sixth Amendment, Rule 606(B), and the Intrusion Into Jury Deliberations of Religious Principles of
Decision, 74 Tenn. L. Rev. 167, 189 (2007).
87. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) advisory committee’s note on subdivision (b); see also Pena-Rodriguez,
137 S. Ct. at 864.
88. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869. The Court held:
[W]here a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial
stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires
that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the
evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.
Id.
89. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 122 (1987) (rejecting a Sixth Amendment exception
for evidence that some jurors were intoxicated during the trial); see also Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at
868; Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 530 (2014) (rejecting post-verdict juror testimony that
forewoman failed to disclose pro-defendant bias during voir dire).
90. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 858; see McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268–69 (1915); United
States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1851), overruled in part by Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467
(1918).
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affected, and no personal bias, or pre-possession, in favor [of] or
against either party.’”91 Allowing juror testimony of racial bias on
this ground would compel review of any influence that might have
led a jury to reach an partial verdict, based on Sixth Amendment
considerations, as even the Court in Pena-Rodriguez extended the
term “racial bias” to include instances of ethnic bias.92
By effectively eviscerating the rule against juror impeachment in
cases of racial bias with reasoning rooted in the Sixth Amendment,
the Court opened the door to other challenges, such as religious bias
during deliberations.93 In Pena-Rodriguez, the Court did not address
how eliminating racial bias in the name of “equal treatment under the
law” differs from the unequal treatment due to other factors, such as
the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion.94
The Constitution protects the free exercise of religious beliefs.95
Consequently, a juror may express his religious beliefs during jury
deliberations, as is his constitutional right.96 However, a juror who
bases his verdict on a religious principle, rather than the law, has
“abdicated [his] responsibility to decide the case on the basis of the
law and facts and has deprived the defendant of his Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury.”97 The Colorado Supreme
Court, in a case involving a juror who read text from the Bible during
jury deliberations as rationale for his decision, made a distinction
between religious text and religious discussion and afforded the
defendant a new trial.98 The ruling has been criticized for constituting
91. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 871–72 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Sixth Amendment’s
protection of the right, ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions,’ to a ‘trial, by an impartial jury,’ is limited to the
protections that existed at common law when the Amendment was ratified.”); see also Pettis v. Warren,
1 Kirby 426, 427–28 (Conn. 1788).
92. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863.
93. Sanderford, supra note 86, at 190 (“[P]ermitting a juror to testify that a jury’s decision was based
on religious principle would constitute a major shift in the law, requiring the overruling of McDonald v.
Pless and Hyde v. United States, and opening the door to numerous other challenges . . . .”).
94. See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.
95. U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
96. Id.
97. Sanderford, supra note 86, at 188.
98. People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616, 631 (Colo. 2005). The Colorado Rule of Evidence 606 is almost
identical to its federal counterpart:
Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) strongly disfavors any juror testimony impeaching
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a major shift in the law, “requiring the overruling of McDonald v.
Pless and Hyde v. United States” by allowing juror testimony that a
“jury’s decision was based on religious principle.”99 The Court’s
decision in Pena-Rodriguez did just that.100
C. The Court Did Not Provide a Workable Standard to Eliminate
Racial Bias
The Court did not offer an appropriate standard for determining
when adequate prejudice exists to set aside a verdict.101 Additionally,
the Court did not set out procedures that a trial court must follow
when dealing with a request for a new verdict on these grounds.102
Courts need further guidance to prevent the making of “what was
intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public
investigation—to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of
discussion and conference.”103 Jury deliberations have long been
protected, and their value has justified how the loss of evidence has
impacted the justice system.104 Because trial courts are left without a
a verdict, even on grounds such as mistake, misunderstanding of the law or facts,
failure to follow instructions, lack of unanimity, or application of the wrong legal
standard. This rule is designed to promote finality of verdicts, shield verdicts from
impeachment, and protect jurors from harassment and coercion.
Id. at 624 (citations omitted). The court based its decision on the fact that the Bible was brought as an
outside source, carefully distinguishing “between a situation in which a Bible was actually introduced in
the jury room—deemed impermissible—and a situation where a juror merely discusses ‘his or her
religious upbringing, education, and beliefs’ with fellow deliberating jurors—presumably permissible.”
Sanderford, supra note 86, at 191. But, “the defendant suffers the same injury whether the jury read
directly from the Bible or merely discussed it.” Id. at 188.
99. Sanderford, supra note 86, at 190.
100. See generally Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
101. Id. at 870.
102. Id.
[T]he experience of the courts going forward[] will inform the proper exercise of trial
judge discretion in these and related matters. This case does not ask, and the Court
need not address, what procedures a trial court must follow when confronted with a
motion for a new trial based on juror testimony of racial bias. The Court also does not
decide the appropriate standard for determining when evidence of racial bias is
sufficient to require that the verdict be set aside and a new trial be granted.
Id. (citations omitted).
103. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267–68 (1915).
104. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 874 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Even if a criminal defendant whose constitutional rights are at stake has a critical need
to obtain and introduce evidence of such statements, long-established rules stand in the
way. The goal of avoiding interference with confidential communications of great
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standard or set of guidelines to follow, the door has been left open to
inquiry into these deliberations without restriction. The only
guidance that the Court provided for determining when racial bias
adequately justifies inquiry into a verdict is where a juror makes a
“clear statement indicating that he or she relied on racial stereotypes
or animus to convict a criminal defendant.”105 But Justice Kennedy
further explained that “[n]ot every offhand comment indicating racial
bias or hostility will justify setting aside the no-impeachment bar.”106
However, if the trial court is to make this determination, it would first
need to decide if the comment is “offhand.” This kind of inquiry
requires the same analysis that courts faced prior to this decision,
which included weighing the gravity of the racial comment against
the interests of existing safeguards.107
Additionally, the Court’s ruling was unpersuasive in its claim that
it aims to eliminate racial bias from jury deliberations. In Batson,
where a prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove every AfricanAmerican from the jury, the Supreme Court intended to eliminate
jury-based racial discrimination by concluding that racial bias cannot
be the motivating factor behind the use of peremptory strikes.108
Despite the Court’s effort, stating a legitimate purpose for the use of
a peremptory challenge could overcome an allegation of an
value has long been thought to justify the loss of important evidence and the effect on
our justice system that this loss entails.
Id.
105. Id. at 869 (majority opinion).
106. Id.
Not every offhand comment indicating racial bias or hostility will justify setting aside
the no-impeachment bar to allow further judicial inquiry. For the inquiry to proceed,
there must be a showing that one or more jurors made statements exhibiting overt
racial bias that cast serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s
deliberations and resulting verdict. To qualify, the statement must tend to show that
racial animus was a significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.
Whether that threshold showing has been satisfied is a matter committed to the
substantial discretion of the trial court in light of all the circumstances, including the
content and timing of the alleged statements and the reliability of the proffered
evidence.
Id.
107. See id. at 866. Evidence of misconduct other than juror testimony was used by courts upon
balancing safeguards already in place against the defendant’s Sixth Amendment interest.
Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 866; see also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987).
108. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986).
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illegitimate use.109 In Batson, the Court recognized the importance of
eliminating racial bias in jury selection, but its approach was “aimed
at only the most overt discrimination.”110 Thus, the ruling in Batson
continues to be ineffective in actually eliminating bias from jury
selection because any allegation of bias can be overcome by simply
stating any other legitimate reason for using the peremptory
challenge.111 Moreover, courts have expanded the Batson ruling to
apply to gender-motivated peremptory strikes.112 Similarly, the
Supreme Court in Pena-Rodriguez again attempted to remove racial
bias from a different part of the jury system at the expense of
exposing jurors to scrutiny and compromising the finality of
verdicts.113 However, the Court’s ruling will prove unworkable
109. See generally id.; see also Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A
Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 809, 833 (1996).
Batson held that a defendant could overcome the presumption that peremptory
challenges were used legitimately by making a prima facie case that the challenges in
the case at hand were race-motivated (Batson step one), after which the burden would
then shift to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral reason for the challenges
(Batson step two). If a race-neutral reason were proffered, then the final step would be
for the trial court to determine whether the challenger had met his or her burden of
proving that the peremptory challenges were in fact exercised because of racial
prejudice (Batson step three).
Id. at 833–34 (footnotes omitted).
110. Sarah Jane Forman, The #Ferguson Effect: Opening the Pandora’s Box of Implicit Racial Bias in
Jury Selection, 109 Nw. U. L. Rev. Online 171, 175 (2015).
111. See generally Batson, 476 U.S. 79.
It also raised the specter of a generalized equal protection attack on the very existence
of the peremptory challenge: If a prospective juror has a right not to be excluded for
constitutionally impermissible reasons, does he or she not also have a right not to be
excluded for reasons which, by definition, cannot be rationally articulated? It is an odd
constitutional right indeed which cannot be taken away for certain reasons, but which
can freely be taken away for a universe of other unstated and unstatable reasons. It is
also an odd constitutional right that can be taken away without explanation by a
lawyer, but not by a state legislature.
Hoffman, supra note 109, at 835–36 (footnotes omitted).
112. See United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that use of genderbased peremptory strikes violated defendant’s right to jury composed of fair cross-section of
community); see also Nancy J. Cutler, Recent Development: J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Excellent
Ideology, Ineffective Implementation, 26 St. Mary’s L.J. 503, 515 (1994) (“After finding similar
discrimination in the use of race- and gender-based peremptory strikes, Justice Blackmun applied midlevel equal protection scrutiny to the use of gender-based peremptory challenges.”).
113. See generally Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). “Allowing such post-verdict
inquiries would ‘seriously disrupt the finality of the process.’ It would also undermine ‘full and frank
discussion in the jury room, jurors’ willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and the community’s
trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople.’” Id. at 878 (citations omitted) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120–21 (1987)).
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unless the Court also provides guidelines for how lower courts should
apply the exception that it created for Rule 606(b). What will prevent
courts from expanding this ruling into gender-bias inquiries in jury
deliberations, as has been done with the Batson holding? Indeed, at
the core of our democracy is the “promise of equality under the
law.”114 Equally important are the finality of verdicts and the
protection of free, frank, and candid jury deliberations that maintain
the integrity of the jury system and its role in democracy. Allowing
inquiry into jury deliberations for reasons of discovering racial bias
not only opens the door to other equal protection inquiries but the
Court’s lack of guidance in Pena-Rodriguez also leaves it to the
lower courts to answer whether the racial bias allegations, no matter
how overtly stated, have actually made a difference in the outcome of
the verdict.115
III. Proposal
The right to an impartial jury trial is a fundamental principle in our
justice system.116 The Supreme Court, called upon to determine when
this right has been compromised, has now added racial bias to the
narrow list of exceptions to Rule 606(b), weakening the rule’s
protections of verdict finality, no juror harassment, and free and frank
jury discussions.117 But as seen in previous attempts by the Court to
eliminate racial bias from the trial system, the result is often
unworkable.118 In Batson, the Court aimed to eliminate attorney
114. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (“Indeed, with the exception of voting, for most
citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the
democratic process.”); see also J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994).
115. See generally United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2009).
[T]he court concluded that the lower court “did have the discretion to inquire into the
validity of the verdict by hearing juror testimony to determine whether ethnically
biased statements were made during jury deliberations and, if so, whether there is a
substantial probability that any such comments made a difference in the outcome of
the trial.”
Wolin, supra note 29, at 278 (quoting Villar, 586 F.3d at 87).
116. Wolin, supra note 29, at 297 (citing Villar, 586 F.3d at 76); see also Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct.
at 861 (“The jury is a central foundation of our justice system and our democracy.”).
117. See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 857; United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir.
2008), abrogated by Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
118. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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racial bias toward potential jurors as well as to protect a juror’s right
to sit on a jury.119 Although “these biases should be acknowledged
and formally addressed” to avoid “denial of constitutional rights and
eroding public confidence in the fairness of jury verdicts,” the Court
should look to more effective ways to implement a strategy to reach
this goal.120 “Studies suggest that, despite Batson . . . , demographic
profiling remains a principal strategy during voir dire.”121 Attorneys
have found ways around the Batson challenge, being able to offer any
reason other than a racially discriminatory one for eliminating a
juror.122 As critics of Batson point out, “[T]he Court purports to solve
the problem of endemic jury discrimination by simply mandating a
state of denial about it.”123 In doing so, the Court did not provide a
workable strategy of eliminating racial bias from the process of jury
selection. Similarly, thirty-two years later in Pena-Rodriguez, the
Court revisited the attempt to eliminate bias from the trial process,
although on a different end—the jury itself. Rather than assess the
shortcomings of its prior, arguably failed attempt to set out a
workable scheme to eliminating racial bias, the Court provided a
similarly unworkable ruling that compromises the system more than
it protects it.
When courts decide at their discretion that “what went on in the
jury room [is] judicially reviewable for reasonableness or fairness,
trials [are] no longer truly . . . by jury, as the Constitution commands.
Final authority would be exercised by whomever is empowered to
decide whether the jury’s decision was reasonable enough[] or based
on proper considerations.”124 The prior discretion of the district court
to determine if the application of Rule 606(b) extends to an allegation
of juror misconduct was not changed by the ruling in Pena119. See generally id.
120. Siegfried C. Coleman, Reliance on Legal Fiction: The Race-Neutral Juror, 41 S.U. L. Rev. 317,
318 (2014).
121. Joshua Revesz, Comment, Ideological Imbalance and the Peremptory Challenge, 125 Yale L.J.
2535, 2536 (2016).
122. See generally Batson, 476 U.S. 79.
123. Tania Tetlow, Symposium, Why Batson Misses the Point, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1713, 1714 (2012).
124. United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Carson v. Polley, 689
F.2d 562, 581 (5th Cir. 1982)), abrogated by Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
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Rodriguez. The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue as to how a
district court judge should treat possible racial biases of jurors
because it did not provide a standard by which to guide the lower
court into making the determination as to what merits an exception
under Rule 606(b).125 For those courts which already followed this
exception to the no-impeachment rule, the judge still needs to
determine what constitutes juror misconduct and when to set aside
the verdict. One court may decide that an offhand racial slur is
enough to require inquiry into the verdict, while another court may
interpret the standard to be broader, and may choose to deny inquiry
under the same circumstances.126 All the Supreme Court did in PenaRodriguez was provide a bright line rule that racial bias is an
additional exception to Rule 606(b) and may be grounds for setting
aside a verdict. The Court has left to the state rules of professional
ethics and to the discretion of the lower courts the “practical
mechanics of acquiring and presenting such evidence.”127 A lower
court may still conclude that a juror’s bias did not rise to the standard
required to bring the verdict’s credibility into question.
The Supreme Court should provide a test or standard by which
lower courts can determine when racial bias sufficiently influences
the verdict, so as to allow an exception to Rule 606(b). Although it
seems unlikely that racial bias can be measured uniformly using a
test or standard without any direction, courts will still make this
determination on their own just as they did before. For example, the
125. United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The district court’s response to an
allegation of juror misconduct is generally reviewed only for abuse of discretion.”).
126. See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869. The Court stated:
Not every offhand comment indicating racial bias or hostility will justify setting aside
the no-impeachment bar to allow further judicial inquiry. For the inquiry to proceed,
there must be a showing that one or more jurors made statements exhibiting overt
racial bias that cast serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s
deliberations and resulting verdict. To qualify, the statement must tend to show that
racial animus was a significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.
Whether that threshold showing has been satisfied is a matter committed to the
substantial discretion of the trial court in light of all the circumstances, including the
content and timing of the alleged statements and the reliability of the proffered
evidence.
Id.
127. Id.
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Villar court, recognizing important policy considerations underlying
the rule, identified two exceptions—extraneous prejudicial
information and outside influence—and concluded that “[a] ‘court
should only conduct such an inquiry “when reasonable grounds for
investigation exist,” i.e., . . . clear, strong, substantial[,] and
incontrovertible evidence that a specific, nonspeculative impropriety
has occurred which could have prejudiced the trial of a
defendant.’”128 Under the Pena-Rodriguez standard, the Villar
outcome would hold the same validity as the outcome in Shillcutt v.
Gagnon, where the court found no substantial likelihood that an
alleged racial slur in jury deliberations would have prejudiced the
defendant.129
Alternatively, the Supreme Court can set a very strict standard so
that only the most overt and blatant manifestations of racial bias are
considered in overturning a verdict, and the Court can implement
additional safeguards for dealing with lesser showings of bias. For
example, the court can provide an additional instruction to the jury at
the beginning of the trial that jurors may come forward at any time
before the verdict and privately disclose another juror’s misconduct
to the judge and the grounds for which the jurors may do so.
Although this is not a new standard or rule, the additional reminder to
the jurors that they should deal with any concerns regarding
misconduct before the verdict is rendered may help bring those
concerns to the surface sooner in the trial process. Evidence of racial
bias should not be ignored at any stage of the trial process, but a lack
of a defined standard for dealing with such racial bias after a verdict
128. Villar, 586 F.3d at 83.
129. Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1156 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[In] the affidavit submitted after trial,
one juror encouraged the others to be ‘logical’ and to take notice that Shillcutt was black and the girl
was white. Another juror responded by saying Shillcutt ‘wasn’t capable of loving anybody.’”). The
court reasoned:
[E]ven if we could take a close-up view, still we would know little of what prompted
such a comment, or whether it was typical of the observations made by jurors . . . .
[N]o other racial comments were made. The jury deliberated at least five hours prior to
the time the comment was allegedly made, and there is nothing to suggest that in the
final twenty minutes of deliberation the comment influenced or had any impact on the
verdict.
Id. at 1159–60.
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has been rendered may compromise other principles that the jury
system seeks to uphold in maintaining due process.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of Pena-Rodriguez, courts that have not previously
embraced the racial-bias exception must now allow evidence of
jurors’ racial biases to be considered in impeaching a verdict.130 To
protect the integrity of the justice system in cases where extreme
juror bias infringes on a defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury,
the Pena-Rodriguez Court dismissed concerns of disruption to verdict
finality and future invasive inquiries into deliberations.131 However,
as Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion points out, the Supreme Court
has offered no guidance as to what standard trial courts must follow
to determine when evidence of racial bias adequately justifies setting
aside a verdict.132 The Court vaguely provided that not every
“offhand comment” indicative of racial bias will suffice to set aside a
verdict.133 Going forward, the lower courts are therefore left to figure
out on their own how to implement the Supreme Court’s decision in
Pena-Rodriguez. Without further instruction from the Supreme Court
on how to treat different degrees of racial bias and when this bias
warrants setting aside a verdict, lower courts are dealing with the
same decision making as before this ruling. The Supreme Court
should set a standard for the most overt and extreme instances of
racial bias, which will guide the lower courts in making the
determination to set aside a verdict. Additionally, the Court should
implement additional safeguards for uncovering less extreme
expressions of juror racial bias earlier in the trial process.
130. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 870.
While the trial court concluded that Colorado’s Rule 606(b) did not permit it even to
consider the resulting affidavits, the Court’s holding today removes that bar. When
jurors disclose . . . racial bias as serious as the one involved in this case, the law must
not wholly disregard its occurrence.
Id.
131. Id. at 866.
132. Id. at 870 (“The Court also does not decide the appropriate standard for determining when
evidence of racial bias is sufficient to require that the verdict be set aside and a new trial be granted.”).
133. Id. at 869.
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